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Abstract
We study the role of re-election concerns in incumbent parties’ incentives to shape
the information that reaches voters. In a probabilistic voting model, candidates rep-
resenting two groups of voters compete for office. In equilibrium, the candidate rep-
resenting the majority wins with a probability that increases in the degree of political
disagreement—the difference in expected payoffs from the candidates’ policies. Prior
to the election, the office-motivated incumbent party (IP) can influence the degree of
disagreement through policy experimentation—a public signal about a payoff-relevant
state. We show that if the IP supports the majority candidate, then it strategically
designs this experiment to increase disagreement and, hence, the candidate’s victory
probability. We define conditions such that the IP chooses an upper-censoring exper-
iment and the experiment’s informativeness decreases with the majority candidate’s
competence. The IP uses the experiment to increase disagreement even when political
disagreement is due solely to belief disagreement.
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1 Introduction
Voters and politicians are often uncertain about the possible repercussions of different poli-
cies. When candidates advocate different policies, this uncertainty plays an important role
in defining electoral outcomes. Learning about the payoff consequences of policies can then
change voters’ preferences over politicians and affect electoral outcomes. The incumbent
party (IP), through its control over the government, is in a privileged position to affect
what voters can learn. In this paper, we study the effects of re-election concerns on the
incumbents’ incentives to shape the information that reaches voters.
There are many ways in which the incumbent can affect voters’ learning. For example,
the IP can run a small-scale pilot test of a novel policy or design an experiment to evaluate
unobserved effects of existing policies.1 Moreover, when designing the rollout of a complex
new law, the IP can determine which aspects of the law will be enforced before and after
the next election and which preliminary information will be released during the early stages
of the reform.2 Similarly, the IP can establish disclosure rules for government agencies.3
In all these cases, government’s control of information affects what voters can learn and,
consequently, electoral outcomes.4
Although our model fits all these interpretations, to simplify presentation, we will say that
the IP engages in strategic policy experimentation — i.e., the IP can design a public signal
that generates information about the expected payoffs from different policies. We model this
strategic supply of information as a persuasion game (see Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011),
KG henceforth).
Our probabilistic voting model has the following ingredients: (i) Electorate: Uninformed
voters are divided into two groups, majority A and minority B, with differing preferences over
1See Greenberg and Shroder (2004) for many examples of social experiments.
2For instance, the Affordable Care Act (commonly called “ObamaCare”) was signed into law in March
2010, but many of its payoff-relevant features were implemented only after the 2012 presidential election —
e.g., the program’s website HealthCare.org was launched in October 2013.
3For example, the IP can regulate what government agencies can investigate regarding current trends
in gun violence, including what information can be collected. The information (or lack of information)
generated by the government can influence voters’ beliefs about the most appropriate gun control laws.
4See Bernecker, Boyer and Gathmann (2015) for an empirical study of how re-election concerns shape
the incumbent’s incentives to experiment.
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policies. (ii) Parties and Candidates: Two parties compete for office. Parties’ candidates are
differentiated in two dimensions — a position issue (policy) and a valence issue (competence).
With regard to policy, the candidate from Party A will implement the preferred policy of
group A if elected, while the candidate from party B defends the preferred policy of group
B. Candidates also differ in their competence. (iii) Policy Experiment: Party A currently
controls the government and, hence, has the authority to carry out a policy experiment
that reveals information about voters’ policy payoffs. Party leaders (or bureaucrats) are
purely office-motivated; thus, Party A chooses an experiment that maximizes its re-election
probability. (iv) Election: After observing the experiment’s outcomes, candidates revise
their beliefs, and, therefore, the policies that they will implement if elected, while voters
update their evaluation of the candidates’ policies. Voters already know the valence of the
incumbent from party A. During the electoral campaign, voters also observe a noisy signal
about the valence of the untried candidate from party B. Each voter then chooses candidate
A if she is expected to deliver a higher total payoff (valence + policy) than B.
We first note that, in equilibrium, the candidate representing the majority group wins
with a probability that increases in the degree of political disagreement — defined as the
difference in expected payoffs from the policies supported by the candidates. Therefore, the
IP designs the experiment with the sole purpose of increasing political disagreement, which
benefits its candidate.5
We start our analysis by studying, in Section 3, the effect that the incumbent’s valence
vA has on the informativeness of the IP’s optimal policy experiment. We first consider the
case in which the valence distribution of the untried candidate has a log-concave probability
density function (p.d.f.), such as a Normal Distribution. Then, regardless of the preferences of
majority and minority voters, the following single-crossing property holds: If an experiment
does not increase the incumbent’s probability of victory when her competence is vA, then
this experiment does not increase her victory probability if her competence is higher than vA
(Lemma 1). This result implies that there are two cutoffs in the extended real line, such that
the IP prefers to be fully transparent about policy payoffs and, thus, favors fully informative
experiments when the majority candidate is sufficiently incompetent; prefers to be partially
5Stokes (1963) highlights the strategic use of information to shift the salience of issues. See Iyengar and
Simon (2000) for a survey.
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transparent for intermediate levels of competence; and prefers to be completely opaque —
thus providing a completely uninformative experiment — when the majority candidate is
sufficiently competent (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1).
The single-crossing property in Lemma 1 holds for every specification of the preferences
of voters in the majority and minority groups. To characterize the optimal experiment, in
Section 4, we focus on cases in which political disagreement endogenously increases in the
voters’ expectation over an unknown state. Experimental outcomes that lead to an upward
revision of the average state would then magnify political disagreement, which benefits the
IP, and outcomes that produce a downward revision of the average state would reduce dis-
agreement. We show that, under the assumption of a log-concave p.d.f., it is optimal for
the IP to use an upper-censoring experiment (Proposition 3). Such experiments define a
cutoff state, and voters learn the true state when it falls below this cutoff; otherwise, voters
learn only that the state is above the cutoff. That is, an upper-censoring experiment fully
reveals low-disagreement states and pools high-disagreement states. An important implica-
tion is that, as the incumbent’s competence improves, the IP monotonically provides less
information to the electorate.
All of our results derive from the curvature properties of the incumbent’s re-election
probability. Under the log-concave assumption, the re-election probability is locally con-
vex when the incumbent’s valence and disagreement are low and locally concave when they
are high. Intuitively, convexity gives the incumbent incentives to gamble on information
— i.e., to generate an experiment that might increase or decrease disagreement — while
concavity gives incentives to avoid such a gamble. Our results are reversed if the p.d.f. of
the challenger’s valence is log-convex. In the log-convex case, the incumbent’s re-election
probability is convex when her valence and disagreement are low and concave when they are
high. Therefore, the single-crossing property goes in the opposite direction: lower values of
the incumbent’s competence induce less experimentation, while higher competence induces
more experimentation. Moreover, if political disagreement increases with the expected state,
then the IP would favor lower-censoring experiments in the log-convex case.
Our results highlight that one should view the idea of gambling for resurrection (e.g.,
Downs and Rocke (1994)) with caution. In a simple version of this story, an incumbent
politician with a bad reputation and a low probability of re-election is willing to engage in
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war, hoping that a favorable outcome in the battlefield will increase her re-election chances.
Our model complements these papers, by explicitly showing how the gambling for resurrec-
tion result relies on the shape of the probability of re-election — in particular, the opposite
result holds in the log-convex case. Moreover, engaging in war can be viewed as implement-
ing a “full scale,” very informative experiment. As we show, in many cases, the optimal
experiment is only partially informative (upper-censoring in the log-concave case).6
In Section 5, we present alternative interpretations of our model to emphasize that our
results apply to a wide set of economic models. We consider the case in which the incum-
bent’s public signal generates information about her own competence, the case in which the
incumbent generates information about multiple policy dimensions, and the case in which
the IP generates information during the rollout of a major policy reform.
In Section 6, we present the main extension of our model: we allow for heterogeneous
prior beliefs. As Callander (2011, pg. 657) notes, “[M]uch political disagreement is over
beliefs rather than outcomes” — that is, much disagreement is rooted in members of the
electorate holding different views of the likely effects of various policies. To focus on the role
of belief disagreement, we restrict attention to cases in which voters share the same payoff
function, so that political disagreement stems solely from belief disagreement. That is, in the
absence of uncertainty, all voters would agree on the optimal policy, and candidates would
be judged solely on their valence. In this case, one may conjecture that public information
creates consensus among voters; hence, the IP will seldom benefit from persuasion, and belief
disagreement will foster opaqueness. However, we show that this view is flawed. For exam-
ple, if there are more than four possible states, and political disagreement is increasing in the
distance between each group’s expectation of the state, then the IP can generically design
an experiment that increases political disagreement with probability one (Proposition 4).
Section 7 presents additional extensions of the model (the IP supports the minority can-
didate; parties are policy motivated; and the case of competition in information provision).
Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A, and additional results are available online
in Appendix B. We next discuss the related literature.
6In our model, the incumbent can choose any signal that is correlated with the state, while other models
consider restrictions on the choice of signals — e.g., the gamble in Carrillo and Mariotti (2001) is constrained
to be normally distributed, while the gamble in Duggan and Martinelli (2011) must be a “slant.”
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Related Literature: Our paper is related to, and borrows from, various literatures.
Policy experimentation and electoral outcomes : A number of papers explore how policy
experimentation (learning how different policies map into payoffs) can influence future poli-
cies and electoral outcomes, as well as how re-election concerns by office-motivated politicians
guide the choice of policy experiments. One strand of the literature focuses on the role that
experimentation plays in uninformed voters’ learning about the incumbent’s or the chal-
lenger’s characteristics (Biglaiser and Mezzeti, 1997; Majumdar and Mukand, 2004; Duggan
and Martinelli, 2011; Willens, 2013; Fu and Li, 2014; and Dewan and Hortala-Vallve, 2014).
In the benchmark interpretation of our model, the IP controls the flow of information about
policy payoffs, given the exogenous information about valence available to voters. However,
in Section 5.3, we reinterpret our model as the IP controlling the flow of information about
valence, given the exogenous information about policy payoffs. Bernecker, Boyer and Gath-
mann (2015) consider a model in which politicians use their choice of policy experiment to
signal competence and test it with data from the 1996 US Welfare Reform. While theirs is a
“signaling” model of competence, their finding that governors with high reputation are less
likely to experiment is consistent with our results in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.
Some papers consider how information revelation about valence during an election in-
fluences the strategies of parties and politicians. For instance, Carrillo and Mariotti (2001)
study how information about valence affects parties’ choice of whether to run a known or
an untried candidate; Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) study how this information affects
parties’ investments in improving candidate or policy quality; and Boleslavsky and Cotton
(2015) study how this information affects parties’ incentives to run moderate candidates.
Our paper complements these papers by studying how information about valence affects
policy experimentation by the incumbent. In all four papers, through different, but related,
mechanisms, an increase in information leads to a change in party strategy, which can lead
to a decrease in voter welfare.
Another strand considers the effect of policy experimentation on voters’ learning about
policies. For instance, Callander (2011) and Callander and Hummel (2014) study the incen-
tives of politicians to engage in trial-and-error experimentation, while Callander and Harstad
(2015) consider the effect of learning spillovers on the incentives of heterogeneous districts to
experiment. Millner, Ollivier, and Simon (2014) show that a policy-motivated party — in or-
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der to show the opposite party that its belief is “wrong” and to reduce belief disagreement—
may over-experiment when politicians have heterogeneous prior beliefs. In contrast, in our
model, the purely office-motivated IP strategically discloses information to increase belief
disagreement and influence elections.
Bayesian Persuasion: Our paper relates to the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion
that follows KG. In Alonso and Caˆmara (2016b), the goal of the “sender” is also to sway
elections in favor of her preferred alternative. However, in their model, there is no uncertainty
over voters’ preferences after the results of the experiment are realized. Therefore, the only
information that is relevant for electoral outcomes is whether voters prefer one policy or the
other — how strongly they do so is irrelevant. In our probabilistic voting model, however,
this intensity is crucial — the IP wins re-election with a probability that increases in the
the degree of political disagreement. Therefore, the IP would like to convince voters from
the majority group not only that its candidate supports a good policy, but also that the
minority candidate supports a bad policy.
Kolotilin et al. (2015) study a Bayesian persuasion model with a single receiver that has
private information about his type and a sender with a payoff that is a linear increasing func-
tion of the expected state. Although their setup and focus are quite different from ours, they
find (Theorem 2) that if the receiver’s type has a log-concave (log-convex) p.d.f., then it is
optimal to use an upper (lower) censorship signal. Their proof relies on a mechanism-design
approach, while our proof of Proposition 3 is closer to the concave-closure approach of KG.
Polarization and Disagreement : A number of papers argue that access to information
can increase polarization and disagreement (e.g., Dixit and Weibull, 2007; Van den Steen,
2011; and Alonso and Caˆmara, 2016c). In most papers, a higher disagreement is a somewhat
unintended side effect of the actions of individuals generating information, such as the media
catering to the demand of biased voters. In our main extension (Section 6), the IP generates
information with the sole purpose of increasing belief disagreement to benefit its candidate.
2 Model
Overview: There are two parties and two groups of voters. Party A represents voters in
group A and party B represents voters in group B, where group A is larger than B. In our
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benchmark model, party A holds office at the beginning of the game (Section 7 presents
the opposite case). The incumbent party (IP) strategically designs a policy experiment to
influence the next election. Voters observe the experiment’s results and update their beliefs
about policy payoffs. Voters then observe a (possibly noisy) signal about the valence of
untried candidate B — voters already know the valence of incumbent A. The election takes
place; the elected candidate implements a policy; payoffs are realized; and the game ends.
Voters’ Preferences: Voters care about the policy choice and the valence (i.e., competence)
of the elected official. If elected, the candidate has to choose one policy x from the compact,
convex set X ⊂ Rd, with a finite d ≥ 1. For example, X can represent the set of feasible
governmental budget allocations across d projects, the government’s policy on a left-right
Downsian model, or a proportional income tax rate. Each citizen’s payoff from policy x
depends on an unknown state θ ∈ Θ ≡ {θ1, . . . , θN}, with a finite N ≥ 2. To simplify
presentation, let Θ ⊂ R and θ1 < . . . < θN . Players share a common prior belief p in the
interior of the simplex ∆(Θ). Citizens within each group are homogeneous, but groups differ
in their policy preferences. Formally, each citizen in group i ∈ {A,B} has preferences over
policies characterized by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui(x, θ), where ui is
a differentiable function of x. Each candidate is also endowed with a valence v ∈ R, which
we discuss momentarily. For a voter in group i, the total payoff from electing a politician
with valence v who implements policy x when state θ is realized is
U i(v, x, θ) = v + ui(x, θ).
Political Parties: We model each party as a primarily office-motivated institution (or,
similarly, party leaders and bureaucrats as purely office-motivated individuals), with ties to
the policy interests of a particular group of voters. Formally, each party receives payoff one
if its candidate is elected and zero otherwise. If elected, party A implements the policy that
maximizes the expected payoff of voters in group A, while party B implements the best policy
for voters in group B. Our assumption is equivalent to assuming that parties are both office-
and policy-motivated, but myopic (or having lexicographic preferences): they first maximize
the probability of winning the election, and, once elected, they implement their preferred
policy. Consequently, the preferences of each party and those of the voters it represents are
7
only partially aligned. Party A always strictly prefers to elect its own candidate, indepen-
dently of policies and valences. However, given parties’ policies, voters in group A prefer to
elect the candidate from party B if she is sufficiently more competent than the candidate
from party A. See Section 7 for further discussion on policy-motivated parties.
Strategic Policy Experimentation: The IP controls the government and has the monopoly
over a policy experiment (a public signal that is correlated with the state). By strategically
designing this experiment, the party can influence voters’ beliefs and electoral outcomes.
Formally, prior to the election, the IP chooses a policy experiment pi, consisting of a finite
realization space S and a family of distributions over S, {pi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ, with pi(·|θ) ∈ ∆(S).
Experiment pi is “commonly understood”: pi is observed by all players who agree on the
likelihood functions pi(·|θ), θ ∈ Θ. Players process information according to Bayes rule, so
that q(s|pi, p) is voters’ updated posterior belief after observing realization s ∈ S of pi. To
simplify notation, we use q or q(s) as shorthand for q(s|pi, p).
Our learning technology follows important assumptions from KG: the IP has the monopoly
over the experiment; it has no private information; it can choose any experiment that is cor-
related with the state; and experiments are costless to the IP. As in our model, Callander
(2011) and Callander and Hummel (2014) consider a learning technology in which the in-
cumbent party has the monopoly over the policy experiment and has no private information.
However, they consider a different learning technology — one related to a Brownian process.
In order to learn, the incumbent must implement a new policy, and all players (including the
IP) incur the resulting policy payoff of this experiment. Thus, we interpret these as models
of “full-scale” policy experimentation. In our benchmark model, we view the experiment as a
small-scale policy trial, that does not directly affect the payoff of the IP. The IP controls the
informativeness of the trial by strategically designing its protocol (designing treatment and
control groups, evaluation tools, etc.). In Section 5, we consider alternative interpretations
of this public signal.7
Candidate’s Policy: We refer to the candidates from parties A and B as candidates A and
B, respectively. Parties and their candidates have the same preferences: they want to max-
7In Section B.7 of online Appendix B, we consider costs that increase in the experiment’s informational
content.
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imize the probability of winning the election, and, if elected, they will implement their pre-
ferred policy. There are no exogenous commitment devices available to politicians. However,
since the candidates’ party affiliations and the experiment’s results are common knowledge,
in equilibrium, voters can correctly anticipate the policy that each candidate would choose.
If elected, candidate i ∈ {A,B} will implement policy xi∗(q) ≡ arg maxx∈X
∑
θ∈Θ qθu
i(x, θ).
We refer to xi∗(q) as the “preferred policy” of candidate i.
The only distinction that we make is that candidates are endowed with valence, which
we define next, while party bureaucrats control the flow of information in the government.
We could also assume that the incumbent politician directly chooses the policy experiment.
Candidate’s Valence: Besides the policy dimension, candidates also differ in a valence
dimension. All players already know the valence vA of incumbent A since they observe her
performance in office. After the IP chooses its experiment, but before the election, voters
observe valence vB of untried candidate B. Our timing assumption is rooted in the fact that
it takes time to set up and implement policy experiments, while the identity (and, hence,
the actual valence) of the challenger is only defined much closer to the election. Hence, at
the time that the IP chooses an experiment, there is significant uncertainty over the valence
of the next challenger.8
We assume that challenger’s valence vB is a random variable distributed according to the
cumulative distribution function F , with probability density function f . In this paper, we
focus on two cases. We first assume that:
(A1) F is twice differentiable and has full support on the real numbers;9 and f is log-concave.
Condition (A1) holds, for example, for the normal, logistic, and extreme value distribu-
tions. See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for a discussion of the properties of log-concave
density functions. In Section 4.1, we consider the case in which f is log-convex and show that
the main equilibrium features are reversed. We show how this sharp contrast between the two
8Valence is a preference shock that smooths out the probability of victory, as is standard in other proba-
bilistic voting models. We can reinterpret valence as other types of preference shock — see Section 5.3.
9The full-support assumption simplifies presentation, as it avoids corner solutions in which expected vic-
tory probabilities are either zero or one. When this support is bounded, but sufficiently large, our qualitative
results continue to hold if we restrict attention to preference parameters such that solutions are interior.
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cases helps us better understand the IP’s equilibrium incentives to design the experiment.
The model is easily extended to the case in which the incumbent politician is not running
for re-election. The incumbent party A then runs with an untried candidate, and voters
simultaneously observe valences vA and vB of the untried candidates. Although we say that
voters observe candidates’ “true” valences, the model can easily be reinterpreted as voters
observing a noisy, exogenous signal about the valence of each candidate (e.g., information
from media coverage during the campaign). In this case, variables vA and vB are interpreted
as the new expected valence of each candidate, after voters observe the implicit realization
of the signals about valence.10
Election: At the time of the election, voters can predict candidates’ policies xA∗(q) and
xB∗(q). Voters also observe the realized valences vA and vB. Thus, for a citizen in group i,
the total expected payoff of electing candidate j is
U ij(q, vA, vB) = vj +
∑
θ∈Θ
qθu
i(xj∗(q), θ). (1)
To rule out uninteresting equilibria, we eliminate weakly dominated voting strategies. This
implies that each voter votes for the candidate who provides him with the highest expected
utility11. The candidate who wins the majority of the votes is elected and then implements
her preferred policy. Voters in group A are decisive since the group encompasses a majority of
voters. That is, a candidate wins if and only if she receives the support of the majority group.
2.1 Political Disagreement
The previous discussion implies that a voter from group i votes for the candidate from group
A if and only if12
U iA(q, vA, vB) ≥ U iB(q, vA, vB)
⇐⇒
∑
θ∈Θ
qθ
[
ui(xA∗(q), θ)− ui(xB∗(q), θ)] ≥ −(vA − vB). (2)
10Defining the new random variable ξ ≡ vB − vA, our assumption (A1) refers to the distribution of ξ. In
this case, our results on changes in vA would then refer to location shifts of the distribution of ξ.
11Voters have no private information about the state, so there is no information aggregation problem.
Hence, the strategic voting considerations related to the probability of being pivotal are not relevant.
12We abstract from abstentions. One could extend our model so that a citizen is less likely to abstain if
his expected payoff difference between the candidates is higher, similar to Matsusaka (1995).
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The RHS of (2) captures the realized valence differential. The LHS of (2) captures the
degree of political disagreement between the two groups. That is, from the point of view of a
voter in group i, it captures the expected policy-payoff difference from electing the different
candidates. Define the political disagreement from the point of view of group A voters as
D(q) ≡
∑
θ∈Θ
qθ
[
uA(xA∗(q), θ)− uA(xB∗(q), θ)] . (3)
Majority group A is decisive: after an experiment outcome that induces belief q, candidate A
wins the election if and only if she receives the support of voters in group A, D(q) ≥ −vA+vB.
If the realized vB is sufficiently high, then even voters from group A vote for candidate B,
and vice-versa.13 Since vB ∼ F , given vA, the majority candidate wins with probability
W (q; vA) ≡ F (D(q) + vA). (4)
Therefore, candidate A wins the election with a probability that increases in the degree of
political disagreement — candidate A has a “policy advantage” because a majority of voters
believe that she has the “correct” preference, and, hence, she will implement the “correct”
policy.
In order to guarantee the existence of an optimal experiment and simplify notation,
throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumption:
(A2) Political disagreement D is upper semicontinuous in ∆(Θ) and differentiable at the
prior belief.
Condition (A2) holds for a large class of models, including the applications that we study
throughout this paper. Differentiability of F and (A2) imply thatW is upper semicontinuous
in ∆(Θ) and differentiable at the prior belief.14
13Voters for which the final vote goes in consonance with valence preferences, rather than with policy
preferences, are dubbed “Stokes voters” by Groseclose (2001).
14Assumption (A2) implicitly establishes the following. Given q, if there are multiple optimal policies
xi∗(q), then we select an optimal policy such that D is upper semicontinuous. Moreover, it implicitly implies
that we restrict attention to language-invariant equilibria — see Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a) for a discussion
of language-invariant equilibria.
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2.2 Notational Conventions
For vectors q, w ∈ RJ , we denote by 〈q, w〉 the standard inner product in RJ — i.e., 〈q, w〉 =∑J
j=1 qjwj — and we denote by qw the component-wise product of vectors q and w — i.e.,
(qw)j = qjwj.
For an arbitrary real-valued function g, define g˜ as the concave closure of g,
g˜(q) = sup {y|(q, y) ∈ co(g)} ,
where co(g) is the convex hull of the graph of g.
We use pi  pi′ to denote that experiment pi is Blackwell more informative than experiment
pi′. Finally, card(S) denotes the cardinality of the set S.
2.3 Party’s Expected Payoff
The incumbent party’s problem is to choose an experiment pi that maximizes the expected
probability of victory Epi[W (q; v
A)]. Upper semicontinuity of W ensures the existence of an
optimal experiment, and choosing an optimal experiment is equivalent to choosing a proba-
bility distribution σ over q that maximizes Epi[W (q; v
A)], subject to the constraint Eσ[q] = p
(see KG). That is, the supremum of the expected victory probability is
W ∗ = sup
σ
Eσ[W (q; v
A)], s.t. Eσ[q] = p.
The following remarks follow immediately from KG:
(R1) An optimal experiment exists.
(R2) There exists an optimal experiment with card(S) ≤ N .15
(R3) The IP’s maximum expected payoff is W ∗ = W˜ (p; vA).
(R4) The value of persuasion is W ∗ −W (p; vA) = W˜ (p; vA)−W (p; vA).
15Note that, in the original setup of KG, there exists an optimal straightforward signal that directly
recommends an action to the receiver. In our setup, the pivotal majority voter has a binary action space:
vote for candidate A or B. However, when N > 2 in our model, an optimal experiment might require more
than two realizations. This is so because, from the point of view of the IP, before the valence shock is
realized, the voting behavior is probabilistic rather than binary. That is, voting behavior can be interpreted
ex ante as a continuous “action” (probability of electing A) in the interval [0, 1] rather than a binary choice.
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2.4 Application: Spatial Policy Model
Although we prove our main results using the general setup described above, for concreteness
throughout the paper, we illustrate our results using the following application.
Consider a spatial policy model in which the state θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R captures voters’ uncertainty
over the optimal policy in a left-right dimension. Let X = [−x,+x], with x sufficiently large.
Voters in group A have a quadratic policy payoff uA(x, θ) = −(x − θ)2. From the point of
view of majority voter A, with belief q, the optimal policy is linear on the expected value
of the state, xA∗(q) = E[θ|q]. Let xB∗(q) be the optimal policy from the point of view of
minority voter B. Political disagreement (3) is
D(q) =
∑
θ∈Θ
qθ
[
uA(x∗A(q), θ)− uA(x∗B(q), θ)
]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
qθ
[
− (E[θ|q]− θ)2 + (x∗B(q)− θ)2]
=
(
E[θ|q]− x∗B(q))2. (5)
From (5), political disagreement translates naturally into the degree of disagreement over
optimal policies, D(q) = (x∗A(q)− x∗B(q))2.
The shape of the disagreement function D depends fundamentally of the nature of prefer-
ence misalignment between the two groups. We next present three examples, using different
payoff functions for group B. In Example 1, disagreement endogenously becomes a strictly
convex function of beliefs; therefore, any experiment pi increases the expected political dis-
agreement, Epi[D(q)] ≥ D(p). The opposite is true in Example 2: since disagreement is
strictly concave, information, on average, decreases disagreement. In Example 3, disagree-
ment is neither concave nor convex. In these examples, we consider a binary state space
Θ = {0, 1}, and let q2 be the probability that the state is θ = +1. Formally,
Example 1 — Suppose that uB(x, θ) = −(x− 1
2
θ)2. Then, x∗B(q) = 1
2
E[θ|q], and disagree-
ment (5) becomes D(q) = 1
4
E[θ|q]2.
Example 2 — Suppose that uB(x, θ) = −(x2
2
− θ)2. Then, x∗B(q) = √2E[θ|q], and
disagreement (5) becomes D(q) =
(
E[θ|q]−√2E[θ|q])2.
Example 3 — Suppose that uB(x, θ) = −(x − θ)3. Then, x∗B(q) = q2−
√
q2(1−q2)
2q2−1 , and
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disagreement (5) becomes D(q) =
(
q2 − q2−
√
q2(1−q2)
2q2−1
)2
.
Figure 1 illustrates these examples. The three figures on the top contrast the optimal
policy xA∗(q) = q2 (dashed lines) and the different optimal policies xB∗(q) (solid lines). The
three figures on the bottom depict the corresponding political disagreement.
0 1 q2
x*
(a) Example 1: Optimal Policies
.50 1 q2
x*
(b) Example 2: Optimal Policies
0 1
q2
x*
(c) Example 3: Optimal Policies
0 1
q2
D
(d) Example 1: Disagreement
.50 1
q2
D
(e) Example 2: Disagreement
0 1
q2
D
(f) Example 3: Disagreement
Figure 1: Top: Optimal policies xA∗ (solid line) and xB∗ (dashed line); Bottom: Political
disagreement D, with Θ = {0, 1}, q2 = Pr(θ = 1).
3 Valence and Information
In this section, we show that the incumbent party’s gain from any given experiment pi has
a single-crossing property with respect to the incumbent’s valence. This property leads to
a monotone behavior of the informativeness of optimal experiments: as we increase the in-
cumbent’s competence vA, her party does not benefit from providing a more-informative
experiment.
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3.1 Single-Crossing
In our model, the incumbent party seeks to maximize its candidate’s chances of re-election.
Following (4), the likelihood that candidate A wins the election increases in the degree of
political disagreement — a larger D implies that, in the eyes of group A voters, the minority
candidate B is expected to implement a much “worse policy” than A. As the outcome of the
experiment can change the policy championed by each candidate, as well as voters’ expected
payoff from these policies, it follows that policy experimentation can change the degree of
political disagreement. As a result, the IP’s choice of an experiment is driven by its desire
to uncover information that increases political disagreement.
As the underlying state θ is independent of both candidates’ valences, the IP’s choice of
experiment cannot affect the distribution of the challenger’s valence. Nevertheless, if the IP
has access to an experiment that, on average, increases disagreement, as in the example in
Figure 1(d), then it is not clear why the IP would not gain from this experiment indepen-
dently of vA. The next lemma shows that, for any experiment pi, this gain actually satisfies a
single-crossing condition: If the IP prefers not to experiment rather than provide experiment
pi when its candidate’s valence is vA, then the IP continues to find no experimentation better
than experiment pi for any higher valence vA′ > vA.
Lemma 1 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Consider any experiment pi and incumbent’s
valence vA. If, for the IP, no experimentation is better than experiment pi when the incumbent
has valence vA, then no experimentation continues to be better for all higher valences. That
is, if Epi[W (q; v
A)] ≤ W (p; vA), then Epi[W (q; vA′)] ≤ W (p; vA′) for all vA′ > vA.
To understand Lemma 1, note that the effect of changing disagreement by an amount ∆
is that it changes the probability of victory by F (z + ∆) − F (z), with z = D(p) + vA. If
∆ > 0, then the benefit in increasing victory probability, relative to the likelihood that the
challenger’s valence induces z, is given by
F (z + ∆)− F (z)
f(z)
=
∫ ∆
0
f(z + s)
f(z)
ds. (6)
If ∆ < 0, then the cost of decreasing victory probability relative to f(x) is
F (z)− F (z + ∆)
f(z)
=
∫ 0
∆
f(z + s)
f(z)
ds. (7)
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Lemma 1 then follows from the fact that, for log-concave probability density functions, the
ratio f(z+ ∆)/f(z) decreases in z if ∆ > 0, but increases in z if ∆ < 0. That is, the relative
benefit (6) of increasing victory probability decreases in z — hence, in the incumbent’s
competence vA — while the relative cost (7) increases in z. Integrating over all possible
realizations of ∆ generated by experiment pi, we then have that the relative gain from an
experiment pi weakly decreases in the incumbent’s competence. In other words, if the IP
does not gain from experiment pi when the incumbent’s valence is vA, this is still true for
an incumbent candidate of higher valence. Notice that this property is satisfied irrespective
of whether, in the absence of the IP’s experiment, the incumbent is expected to win the
election (F (z) > 1/2) or the minority candidate is the frontrunner (F (z) < 1/2).
The next proposition builds upon Lemma 1 to show that, if we increase the competence
of the majority candidate, then the IP does not benefit from providing a more-informative
experiment.
Proposition 1 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Suppose, also, that pi∗ is an optimal
experiment given incumbent’s valence vA. Then, for any higher valence, experiment pi∗ is
weakly better than any Blackwell more informative experiment. That is, for every vA′ > vA
and every pi′  pi∗, we have
Epi∗ [W (q; v
A′)] ≥ Epi′ [W (q; vA′)]. (8)
In the proof of the proposition, we first rewrite the Blackwell more informative experiment
pi′ as a payoff equivalent grand experiment. In this grand experiment, voters first observe re-
alization s of pi∗, and then they observe an additional experiment pis conditional on s. When
the incumbent’s valence is vA, optimality of pi∗ implies that the IP does not benefit from
disclosing any additional information pis after each realization s of pi
∗. We then apply Lemma
1 to each posterior belief q∗ in the support of pi∗: if the IP does not benefit from disclosing in-
formation in addition to pi∗ when the incumbent’s valence is vA, then the IP does not benefit
from disclosing any information in addition to pi∗ when the incumbent’s valence is higher.16
16Although Lemma 1 holds for any experiment, the result in Proposition 1 is deeply rooted in the endoge-
nous properties of optimal experiments. In general, two Blackwell-ordered experiments do not enjoy this
single-crossing property. If pi′  pi for some non-optimal pair of experiments, then it might be the case that
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Next, we apply Proposition 1 to characterize the relationship between the IP’s optimal
level of transparency and the incumbent’s valence.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. There are cutoffs vA1 and v
A
2 in the ex-
tended real line, with vA1 ≤ vA2 , such that:
(i) a fully informative experiment is optimal if vA < vA1 ;
(ii) a partially informative experiment is optimal if vA1 < v
A < vA2 ; and
(iii) an uninformative experiment is optimal if vA2 < v
A.
Corollary 1 defines partitions on the expected competence of the majority candidate.
When the incumbent party’s candidate is sufficiently incompetent, it prefers to be com-
pletely transparent about policies, and engages in fully informative experimentation; the
IP is partially transparent for intermediate levels of competence and is completely opaque
(forgoes experimentation) when its candidate is sufficiently competent.
Corollary 1 does not guarantee that cutoffs vA1 and v
A
2 are finite.
17 Proposition B.1 in
online Appendix B provides sufficient conditions so that vA1 and v
A
2 are finite.
3.2 Examples
We next provide some examples to illustrate the effects of the incumbent’s valence vA on the
IP’s payoff function W and on the optimal experiment.
Recall that W (q; vA) = F (D(q) + vA). Figure 2 illustrates how a higher vA increases W
for each q and changes the overall curvature of W . It assumes that F follows a Normal Dis-
tribution and uses the political disagreement D from the spatial policy model in Figure 1(d).
Recall that we can derive the optimal experiment from the concave closure of W (see KG
for details). In particular, whether W is concave or convex is important to define whether
or not the IP benefits from implementing an informative experiment. Although in Figure
1(d) disagreement D is strictly convex, the resulting payoff W might be locally concave or
the IP prefers the less informative pi when valence is low and prefers the more informative pi′ when valence
is high: Epi[W (q; v
A)] > Epi′ [W (q; v
A)] and Epi[W (q; v
A′)] < Epi′ [W (q; vA′)] for some vA′ > vA. See Section
B.2 in online Appendix B for details.
17E.g., in Example 2 from Section 2.4, if the prior belief already maximizes disagreement, p2=0.5, then no
information disclosure is optimal for all values of vA, so that vA1 = v
A
2 = −∞.
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Figure 2: Effects of vA on victory probability W , using disagreement D from Figure 1(d).
locally convex, depending on belief q2 and on valence v
A. Log-concavity of f implies that
F (D(q) + vA) is locally concave for sufficiently high values of D(q) + vA and locally convex
for sufficiently low values. The red solid lines in Figure 3 depict the concave closure of W .
We next use Figure 3 to derive an optimal experiment.
First, suppose that vA is sufficiently low, as in Figure 3(a). The IP’s payoff W is every-
where strictly convex; hence, any optimal experiment must be fully informative, indepen-
dently of the prior belief.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
q2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
W˜
(a) Low Values of vA
q
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
W˜
(b) Intermediate Values of vA
q '
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
q2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
W˜
(c) High Values of vA
Figure 3: Concave closure of W from Figure 2.
Now suppose that vA is intermediate, as in Figure 3(b). The concave closure W˜ is given
by a straight line in the set of beliefs q2 ≤ q¯, and by W itself for q2 ≥ q¯. Consequently, no
experimentation is optimal for all priors p2 ≥ q¯. When p2 ≥ q¯, although any informative ex-
periment increases average disagreement (D is strictly convex), any informative experiment
is strictly worse for the IP than no information disclosure. Signal realizations that increase
political disagreement increase victory probability by only a small amount, while signal re-
alizations that decrease political disagreement decrease victory probability by a relatively
large amount. Now suppose that p2 ≤ q¯. Since in this set W˜ (q; vA) > W (q; vA), policy
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experimentation is valuable. Every optimal experiment is partially informative and induces
exactly two posterior beliefs, q2 = 0 and q2 = q¯. Finally, for each prior belief p2 ∈ (0, 1),
optimal experiments are less informative in Figure 3(b) than in Figure 3(a).
As we further increase vA, the cutoff q¯ decreases to q¯′ — see Figure 3(c). Therefore, no
experimentation is optimal for a larger set of prior beliefs. Moreover, for the prior beliefs in
the set p2 ≤ q¯′, every optimal experiment is supported only on the posterior beliefs q2 = 0 and
q2 = q¯
′. Consequently, the partially informative experiment in Figure 3(c) is less informative
than the partially informative experiment in Figure 3(b).
What if political disagreement is everywhere strictly concave, as in Figure 4? Figures 5
and 6 use a normally distributed vB to illustrate the corresponding victory probability W ,
which might be locally concave or convex, depending on the incumbent’s valence. See online
Appendix B (Section B.4.1) for a detailed discussion of this example.
We conclude by highlighting that the IP might find it optimal to experiment even when
its candidate is the frontrunner and might find it optimal not to experiment even when its
candidate is the underdog. For example, in Figure 3(b), if the prior belief is p2 = 0.8, then,
without experimentation, the majority candidate wins with a very high probability, above
90%. Nevertheless, it is optimal for the incumbent party to provide a partially informative
experiment, because it increases its candidate’s expected victory probability even further. In
Figure 6(a), if the prior belief is p2 = 0.45, then, without information disclosure, the majority
candidate wins with a very low probability, around 26%. Nevertheless, any informative
experiment decreases the candidate’s expected victory probability even further .
qmax0 1 q2
D
Figure 4: Strictly Concave Political Disagreement.
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Figure 5: Effects of vA on victory probability W , using disagreement D from Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Concave closure of W from Figure 5.
3.3 Information and Voter Welfare
We next apply our results to highlight the possible negative effects of the incumbents’ policy
experimentation on voters’ welfare.
In many voting models, interested parties strategically provide information to voters. In
some cases, this information can adversely affect voters’ equilibrium welfare — voters’ payoff
would be higher if they made uninformed choices. For instance, in Alonso and Caˆmara
(2016b), the information provided by the IP always weakly decreases the expected payoff
of a majority of voters under a simple majority voting rule. This is so because the optimal
experiment has signal realizations targeting different winning coalitions of voters.
In our model, the IP cannot target different winning coalitions because voters in group A
are representative. Nevertheless, the next proposition shows that the IP’s optimal experiment
may hurt all voters in majority group A.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (A1) holds. Consider the spatial policy model from Section
2.4, with payoffs ui(x, θ) = −(x − βiθ)2. If either βAβB < 0 or |βB| > 2|βA|, then there
exists a finite cutoff v¯A such that, for any vA < v¯A, the IP’s optimal experiment strictly
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decreases the expected payoff of all voters in majority group A.
The result follows from the different interests of the IP and voters A, and from the fact
that the IP benefits from promoting disagreement. The IP’s goal is to elect candidate A, not
to ensure that the elected candidate implements a good policy for voters A. Candidate A is
more likely to win when information leads candidate B to adopt a new policy that voters A
consider worse. This worse policy benefits the IP, but it hurts voters A when candidate B
is elected.
Under the conditions of the proposition, the IP implements a fully informative experi-
ment, and the information (on average) leads candidate B to implement a worse policy for
voters A. This is the case here, as preference misalignment is sufficiently severe: If βAβB < 0
(candidates want policies with opposing signals) or |βB| > 2|βA| ≥ 0 (from A’s point of view,
candidate B “overreacts” to information), then voter A strictly prefers an elected candidate
B not to have access to any informative experiment. When vA is sufficiently low, candidate
A is unlikely to win (the benefit of providing information to candidate A is small), while
candidate B is likely to win (the loss of providing information to candidate B is large).
Hence, voters in group A are strictly worse off because of the IP’s experiment. They would
prefer no experiment over the IP’s equilibrium experiment.
4 Disagreement as a Function of the Expected State
To derive a sharper characterization of optimal experiments, in this section, we focus on
models in which political disagreement is a strictly increasing function of the expected value
of some unknown state. Formally, we assume:
(A2′) Political disagreement takes the form D(q) = H(E[θ|q]), where H is twice differen-
tiable and strictly increasing. Moreover, the ratio H
′′
(H′)2 is non-increasing.
Assumption (A2′) holds in many important cases. For example, it holds if disagreement is
a power function of expectation D(q) = γE[θ|q]ρ, with γ > 0, θ1 ≥ 0 and ρ ≥ 1. It also holds
in the spatial policy model of Section 2.4, when voters have quadratic payoffs.18 Later in this
section, we study another relevant application in which (A2′) holds (choice of an income tax).
18If uA(x, θ) = −(x − βAθ)2 and uB(x, θ) = −(x − βBθ)2, where βA and βB are known preference
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Given (A2′), political disagreement increases if voters learn that the realized state is
“high,”which benefits the incumbent, and disagreement decreases if they learn that the
state is “low.”One could then conjecture that the incumbent party would prefer to hide
information about low-disagreement states, and to fully disclose information about high
states. However, Proposition 3 shows that the opposite is true. Borrowing from the statistics
literature, we define an upper-censoring experiment (or right-censoring experiment) as one
that fully reveals low-disagreement states and pools high-disagreement states. Formally:
Definition: Experiment pi is upper-censoring at cutoff state θk if it has a realization
space S = {s1, . . . , sk, spooling} and the following holds. For each n < k, state θn induces
signal realization sn with probability one. For each n > k, state θn induces signal realization
spooling with probability one. Cutoff state θk induces realization spooling with some probability
αk ∈ [0, 1] and induces realization sk with probability 1− αk.
Proposition 3 Suppose that (A1) and (A2′) hold. Then, there exists an optimal exper-
iment pi∗ that is upper-censoring at some cutoff state θk. Moreover, cutoff state θk weakly
decreases with the incumbent’s valence vA.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that for each optimal experiment pi∗, there ex-
ists a payoff-equivalent upper-censoring experiment. The intuition behind the result is as
follows. Under (A1) and (A2′), given vA, the IP’s payoff W (q; vA) = F (H(E[θ|q]) + vA)
is concave if E[θ|q] is high and strictly convex if E[θ|q] is low — see the example in Figure
7(a). Strict convexity implies that the IP always strictly benefits from providing additional
information if the initial experiment yields a non-degenerate belief corresponding to a low
expected state. Therefore, outcomes under optimal experiments that indicate the state to be
low must be fully revealing. Conversely, concavity of the incumbent’s payoffs implies that the
IP cannot be made worse off by an experiment that pools all outcomes corresponding to high
expected states into a single realization. That is, the incumbent then (weakly) gains from
bundling all states in the concave (high-disagreement) region: they all induce signal spooling
with probability one, resulting in a single posterior belief q+ and a high expectation E[θ|q+].
parameters and θ1 ≥ 0, then disagreement is proportional to the square of the expectation of the state,
D(q) = (βA − βB)2E[θ|q]2.
22
E[θ]
W
(a) W changes from convex to concave
E[θ]
W
(b) W changes from concave to convex
Figure 7: Re-election Probability as a Function of the Expected State.
While the IP does not gain from designing an experiment that pools together only states
in the convex region, it may gain from “hiding” some low-disagreement states, such that these
states induce signal spooling with positive probability. Of course, pooling low-disagreement
states would make spooling more likely but would reduce expected disagreement if spooling
occurs. Still, the incumbent must decide which disagreement states should be pulled in
spooling. Suppose that θl and θh are in the convex region, with θl < θh. Should θl or θh be
the incumbent’s first choice to be mixed with the high-disagreement signal spooling? The IP
now faces an important tradeoff. One the one hand, pooling θh leads to a lower reduction in
posterior disagreement resulting from spooling. On the other hand, disclosing θl to voters is
worse than disclosing θh; thus, “hiding” θl by pooling it with spooling is more important than
hiding θh. The proof of Proposition 3 shows that, given (A1) and (A2
′), the first effect
always dominates: the IP’s optimal decision must be a cutoff on θ, independent of prior
beliefs, the incumbent’s valence, and the other parameters of the model — these values are
relevant only for defining the actual cutoff state.
Finally, the cutoff state defined by Proposition 3 monotonically decreases with the in-
cumbent’s valence vA. This implies that the set of optimal upper-censoring experiments
that we construct is Blackwell-ordered: experiments become less Blackwell-informative as
the majority candidate become more competent.
It is important to note that the logic behind the proof of Proposition 3 applies to a broad
class of models. Consider a Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and a receiver, as
in KG. Suppose that the sender’s payoff can be written as a twice differentiable, strictly
increasing function of the expected state. If the derivative of the sender’s payoff function
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is single-peaked, then there exists an optimal experiment that is upper-censoring. In our
model, conditions (A1) and (A2′) simply imply that this derivative is log-concave, hence
single-peaked. See Proposition A.1 in Appendix A for details.
4.1 Log-convex Valence Distribution
Our previous results depend fundamentally on the assumption that the p.d.f. of the chal-
lenger’s valence distribution is log-concave. The results are reversed if we change (A1) so
that f is log-convex.19 In the log-convex case, the single-crossing property goes in the oppo-
site direction: lower values of the incumbent’s competence vA induce less experimentation,
while higher competence induces more experimentation.
Moreover, suppose that political disagreement is a strictly increasing function of the ex-
pected state, as in Section 4. With a log-convex f , if we change assumption (A2′) so that
the ratio H
′′
(H′)2 is non-decreasing,
20 then the optimal experiment is lower-censoring at some
cutoff state θk. Furthermore, this cutoff state decreases with the incumbent’s valence v
A;
hence, the experiment becomes more informative.
The reason for the sharp change in results is rooted in the change in the curvature of
the incumbent’s victory probability as a function of political disagreement and valence vA.
Loosely speaking, in the log-concave case, it is as if the IP features increasing absolute
risk aversion (IARA). When disagreement and the incumbent’s valence are low, the IP
benefits from gambling on disagreement. That is, the IP benefits from implementing a risky
experiment that might increase or decrease disagreement. When disagreement and valence
are high, the IP prefers to avoid these gambles. In the log-convex case, it is as if the IP
features DARA, and the reverse results hold.
Figure 7 illustrates our point with an example in which disagreement equals the expected
state. In Figure 7(a), with a single-peaked p.d.f., the re-election probability changes from
convex to concave. Hence, the incumbent wants to disclose information for low states and
19With a log-convex p.d.f., we can no longer assume full support on the real numbers. To simplify
presentation, we want to avoid corner solutions — that is, cases such that the victory probability F (D(q)+vA)
equals one or zero. To this end, we assume that the support of the challenger’s valence vB is large, and we
restrict attention to valence vA and disagreement D such that F (D(q) + vA) ∈ (0, 1) for all q ∈ ∆(Θ).
20For example, if disagreement is a power function D(q) = γE[θ|q]ρ, with γ > 0, θ1 ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1].
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hide information for high states. In Figure 7(b), with a single-dipped p.d.f., the re-election
probability changes from concave to convex; thus, we find the opposite incentives.
We next present an application of our model, in which political disagreement endoge-
nously becomes a function of the expected state, and Proposition 3 applies.
4.2 Application: Optimal Tax
Consider the following model, in which the elected politician must choose a proportional
income tax x ∈ [0, 1]. Voters care about the consumption of a private good and a public good.
Each voter in group i ∈ {A,B} is endowed with income βi > 0, where βA 6= βB. Given the
implemented tax rate x, voter i consumes (1−x)βi units of the private good. The government
uses all tax revenues to produce the public good. The production technology is such that the
government produces xψ units of the public good, where ψ ∈ (0, 1) is a known technology
parameter.21 Voters’ policy payoff is ui(x, θ) = (1 − x)βi + θxψ, where state θ represents
the unknown marginal value of the public good, with 0 ≤ θ1 < . . . < θN < max{βA, βB} 1ψ .
Given belief q, the optimal tax rate of voter i is xi∗(q) =
(
ψE[θ|q]
βi
) 1
1−ψ
. Both groups want
higher taxes if the marginal value of the public good is higher. However, voters agree on the
optimal tax if and only if the expected marginal value of the public good is zero. Political
disagreement increases with E[θ|q]:
D(q) = (1− xA∗(q))βA + E[θ|q](xA∗(q))ψ − (1− xB∗(q))βA − E[θ|q](xB∗(q))ψ
= γE[θ|q]ρ,
where γ ≡ ψ ψ1−ψ
{
(1− ψ)(βA) −ψ1−ψ + βAψ(βB) −11−ψ − (βB) −ψ1−ψ
}
> 0 and ρ ≡ 1
1−ψ > 1.
Independently of whether the majority group is richer or poorer than the minority group
(βA is higher or lower than βB), disagreement is a power function of the expected state
and satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. To maximize the majority candidate’s victory
probability, the IP’s optimal experiment either partially reveals that the public good is
sufficiently important, or fully reveals that the public good has a low marginal value.
21Without loss of generality, let mAβA +mBβB = 1, where mi is the number of voters in group i. Total
tax revenue is then x.
25
5 Alternative Interpretations
In this section, we emphasize that our model can take on many other interpretations, and,
hence, our results apply to a wide set of economic models. In particular, we can change
the interpretation and structure of the policy space, the set of voters, the public signal, and
the random shock on voters’ preferences. To illustrate the flexibility of our model, we next
present three alternative interpretations. In these applications, we study multiple policy
dimensions; we replace the assumption of a majority and a minority group by one decisive
median voter; we interpret the policy experiment as disclosure of information about a major
policy reform; and we consider the case in which the IP strategically controls information
about its competence.
5.1 The Relative Importance of Policy Dimensions
There is a single policy issue in the spatial policy model of Section 2.4 and in the optimal
tax model of Section 4.2. Moreover, information about θ induces politicians to re-evaluate
their beliefs and choose a new policy. In other important cases, the policy issue is multidi-
mensional, and voters and politicians are convinced about what the optimal policy is, but
they are uncertain about the relative importance of different policy dimensions.
To study these cases, consider the following alternative model. There are d ≥ 2 policy
dimensions (e.g., public education, public health, national defense, etc.). A policy is a d-
dimensional vector x = (x1, . . . , xd). The preferences of voter i ∈ {A,B} are captured by
the preference vector βi = (βi1, . . . , β
i
d) and by the loss function l, with l(0) = 0 and l
′ > 0.
Voters’ policy payoff is
ui(x, θ) =
d∑
j=1
−λj(θ)l(|xj − βij|),
where each function λj(θ) captures the relative importance of policy dimension j given state
θ, with
∑d
j=1 λj(θ) = 1 and λj(θ) > 0. Note that voters’ preferred policies are independent
of beliefs about θ, xi∗j (q) = β
i
j. Although voters know their preferred policies for education
and national defense, they are uncertain about which policy issue will be more important
during the next term.
The degree of political disagreement, from the point of view of voters in group A, is
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simply the expected (weighted) loss from the policy of candidate B,
D(q) = E
[
d∑
j=1
−λj(θ)l(|βAj − βAj |)]−
d∑
j=1
−λj(θ)l(|βBj − βAj |)
]
= E
[
d∑
j=1
λj(θ)l(|βBj − βAj |)
]
.
Given the valence of the incumbent and the valence distribution of the challenger, victory
probability is F (D(q) + vA), as before. To apply Proposition 3, rewrite the unknown state
as follows. For each θ ∈ Θ, compute θ′ ≡∑dj=1 λj(θ)l(|βBj − βAj |). Define a new state space
Θ′ as the collection of θ′. We can then rewrite disagreement simply as the expected value of
θ′, so that victory probability becomes F (E[θ′] + vA) and we can apply Proposition 3.
In summary, voters have a fundamental disagreement over the optimal policy but are un-
certain about how important each policy dimension will be. For instance, suppose that there
are only two issues, and voters disagree relatively more on national defense and less on educa-
tion (that is, |βBj −βAj | is larger for the national defense dimension). The incumbent’s optimal
experiment pools together states that attach more weight to national defense and fully reveals
states that attach more weight to education. That is, the optimal experiment either reveals
that the controversial national defense issue will be “sufficiently important” in the upcoming
years, or it fully reveals that the more agreed-upon education issue will be more important.
We can extend this model to study wedge issues.22 For example, suppose that there are
three groups of voters, i ∈ {A,B,C}. No single group forms a majority, but any pair of
groups forms a majority. The incumbent party A is committed to the preferred policy of
group A, while party B is committed to the preferred policy of group B. Voters in group C
have preferences βCj that are the same as voters’ in group A in some dimensions, but that
are the same as voters’ in group B in the remaining dimensions. Therefore, in equilibrium,
voter C servers as a decisive median voter: for any realized valences vA and vB, and for any
belief q, if voters in group C prefer candidate A over candidate B, then voters in group A
also prefer candidate A; if group C prefers candidate B over candidate A, then group B also
prefers candidate B. Consequently, the incumbent party would like to convince the decisive
voter C that the issues on which they share the same preferences are important, while the
22We thank Ben Golub for suggesting this question.
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issues on which they disagree are not important. The optimal experiment of the incumbent
party is designed to endogenously select the wedge issues that it wants to emphasize.
5.2 The Rollout of a Major Reform
Suppose that the incumbent has implemented a major policy reform (e.g., a major change in
the healthcare system). However, it takes time for voters to observe the true long-run payoff
consequences of this complex new law. During the rollout, the government can choose which
information to publicly collect about the initial effects of the reform. Let the state space Θ
represent how much information the government can potentially collected, in the short-run,
about the long-run consequences of the new policy. Let E[θ|q] be the expected payoff for the
majority voter from keeping the reform, and normalize to zero the payoff from reversing the
reform. To simplify exposition, suppose that, for all short-run information in Θ, the incum-
bent party wants to keep the reform, and the opposing party wants to reverse the reform.
Given the valences, the incumbent’s re-election probability is then F (E[θ|q] + vA) and we
can apply Proposition 3. An incumbent with higher valence is less transparent about the
early effects of her policy reform. Similarly, government transparency decreases in players’
optimism about the reform — if players’ prior beliefs regarding θ are high (in the sense of a
location shift in the prior distribution), then the government becomes less transparent.
5.3 Strategic Information about Competence
Our main results continue to hold if we invert the interpretation of the model: the incumbent
party uses the experiment to strategically reveal information about its competence, while
voters observe an exogenous signal about the relative payoff of parties’ policies. Moreover,
instead of having majority and minority groups of voters, we can assume a continuum of
voters with a representative median voter.
To illustrate this equivalence, consider the following alternative model. The incumbent
party is committed to a policy xA, while the opposing party is committed to a different policy
xB. Without loss of generality, let the incumbent party be the right-wing party xA = +1
and the challenger be the left-wing party xB = −1. There is a continuum of voters indexed
by their ideology y ∈ [y, y]. Let ym be the voter with the median ideology. For voter y, the
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payoff from electing candidate j ∈ {A,B} is vj − (xj − (y − θ))2, where vj is the valence of
candidate j and θ is the current state of the economy.
The incumbent was recently elected and players do not know her realized valence vA ∈
V A ≡ {vA1 , . . . , vAN}, with a finite N ≥ 2 and vAj < vAj+1 . Players share a common prior
belief p in the interior of the simplex ∆(V A). The incumbent can then design a public signal
pi that will reveal information about her competence vA. After voters observe the signal
realization s of pi, they reach the common posterior belief q and update their belief about
the incumbent’s competence E[vA|q]. Voters then observe the realized state of the economy
θ, distributed according to the c.d.f. F, which satisfies (A1). The expected valence of the
challenger is vB, and players do not observer further information about it.
Given any posterior belief q, it is straightforward to verify that the median voter is
decisive, and the incumbents’ victory probability is
W (q; ym) = F
(
E[vA|q]− vB
4
+ ym
)
.
Hence, we can apply Proposition 3: the incumbent’s optimal choice is an upper-censoring
experiment on competence vA. Moreover, as we move the median voter’s ideology ym to
the right, it increases the advantage of the right-wing incumbent. Hence, the right-wing
incumbent chooses to be Blackwell less informative about its competence when facing a
more right-wing voting district, and more informative when facing a more left-wing district.
6 The Role of Belief Disagreement
Heterogeneous prior beliefs play an important role in politics — see Millner, Ollivier, and
Simon (2014) for a recent review of the literature on heterogeneous priors in politics. We
now extend our analysis to the case in which voters in the same group share a common prior
belief, but voters in opposite groups openly disagree over the likelihood of state θ.
Formally, voters in group i have a common prior belief pi in the interior of the simplex
∆(Θ), but priors differ across groups, pA 6= pB. Each party shares its affiliates’ beliefs. Pref-
erences and prior beliefs are common knowledge — voters “agree to disagree.” If we interpret
θ as describing the mapping between policy x and outcomes, then different priors represent
differences in voters’ views about the outcomes that different government policies produce.
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Let qA and qB be the posterior beliefs of voters in groups A and B after observing the
experiment’s results. Voters can correctly predict the policies xA∗(qA) and xB∗(qB) that each
candidate would implement if elected. From the point of view of voters in group A, political
disagreement (3) becomes
D(qA, qB) ≡
∑
θ∈Θ
qAθ
[
uA(x∗A(qA), θ)− uA(x∗B(qB), θ)] . (9)
As in the common priors case, voters in majority group A are decisive, and candidate A wins
with probability F (D(qA, qB)+vA). Again, candidate A wins the election with a probability
that increases in the degree of political disagreement — candidate A has a “policy advantage”
because a majority of voters believe that she has not only the “correct” preference, but also
the “correct” belief, and, thus, she will implement the “correct” policy.
Let rθ ≡ p
B
θ
pAθ
and r ≡ (rθ)θ∈Θ capture the likelihood ratio of prior beliefs. We can then
use the results from Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a) to express disagreement D(qA, qB) as a
function D(qA), which depends only on the beliefs of voters in group A:
D(qA) ≡ D
(
qA, qA
r
〈qA, r〉
)
.
Victory probability then becomes F (D(qA) + vA), and our results continue to hold for this
new function — see online Appendix B for a more detailed analysis.
6.1 Increasing Belief Disagreement
To shed some light on the role of belief disagreement, we now focus on cases in which all voters
share the same preferences, so that political disagreement is zero when voters hold a common
belief. As Callander (2011, pg. 657) notes, “[o]n some policy issues it is conceivable that we
all share common outcome preferences (or at least similar preferences), yet we disagree as to
how best to go about achieving the desired outcome. [...] Viewed this way, much political
disagreement is over beliefs rather than outcomes.”
For example, consider the spatial policy model from Section 2.4. Suppose that voters
share the same payoff function uA(x, θ) = uB(x, θ) = −(x − θ)2. Recall that the optimal
policy is xi∗(qi) = E[θ|qi]. Political disagreement (9) translates naturally into the degree of
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belief disagreement over expectations,
D(qA, qB) =
∑
θ∈Θ
qAθ
[
uA(x∗A(qA), θ)− uA(x∗B(qB), θ)]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
qAθ
[−(E[θ|qA]− θ)2 + (E[θ|qB]− θ)2]
= (E[θ|qA]− E[θ|qB])2. (10)
Similarly, consider the tax model from Section 4.2. Suppose that voters have the same
income normalized to one, βA = βB = 1, and the production technology of the public good is
ψ = 1
2
. The optimal tax rate becomes xi∗(qi) = E[θ|q
i]2
4
, and political disagreement takes the
simple form D(qA, qB) = 1
4
(E[θ|qA]− E[θ|qB])2. In this case, disagreement over the optimal
tax derives solely from the belief disagreement over the marginal value of the public good.
When voters have the same payoff function but different beliefs, can the IP increase
political disagreement? As in these two applications, suppose that political disagreement
is a strictly increasing function of the difference between voters’ expectation over the state.
Although voters share a common payoff function, we show in the next proposition that if the
state space is rich enough, then the IP can generically design an experiment that increases
political disagreement with probability one.
Proposition 4 Suppose that political disagreement strictly increases in the degree of belief
disagreement over expectations, D(qA, qB) = R(|E[θ|qA]− E[θ|qB]|), where R ≥ 0 and R′ >
0. If N ≥ 4, then the IP can generically23 design an experiment that increases political
disagreement with probability one. Consequently, if F has full support on the real numbers,
the value of persuasion is positive for each finite incumbent’s valence vA.
The following example illustrates how the IP can guarantee a higher disagreement.24
Example 4 — Increasing Belief Disagreement: Let Θ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Consider pri-
ors pA = (.05, .45, .45, .05) and pB = (.45, .05, .05, .45), so that E[θ|pA] = E[θ|pB] = 2.5.
Although prior beliefs are different, initial political disagreement is zero. The following bi-
nary experiment S = {s1, s2} is optimal for the IP. States 1 and 3 induce signal s1 with
23Genericity is interpreted over the space of pairs of prior beliefs.
24See Kartik, Lee and Suen (2015) for conditions such that a Blackwell more informative experiment, on
average, brings posterior beliefs closer to each other.
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probability one, while states 2 and 4 induce signal s2 with probability one. After observing
signal s1 beliefs become E[θ|qA] = 2.8 and E[θ|qB] = 1.2, while s2 induces E[θ|qA] = 2.2
and E[θ|qB] = 3.8. Therefore, every realization induces a strictly higher belief disagreement.
From the point of view of voters A, candidate B not only “overreacts” to the information
(updates her policy “too much”), but also moves the policy in the wrong direction. 
7 Extensions
In this section, we consider other extensions of our model. We discuss the case in which the
IP supports the minority candidate, the case in which parties are both office- and policy-
motivated, and the impact of competition in information provision — when the opposing
party can also generate some information about the state. We discuss additional extensions
in online Appendix B (costly experiments, post-election information, and valence shocks that
are independent across voters).
IP Supports the Minority: So far, we have assumed that the IP supports the majority
candidate — that is, candidate A is the incumbent. Now suppose that the minority party B
is in power (hence controls the experiment) and supports the incumbent candidate B. Since
the political advantage of the majority candidate is due solely to political disagreement, the
IP now benefits from decreasing political disagreement. The results from Section 3 now
apply to the valence vB of the incumbent: the IP uses less-informative experiments when
the minority incumbent is more competent (vB is high) and more-informative experiments
when she is less competent. Interestingly, the optimal experiment in Proposition 3 becomes
lower-censoring : the minority party pools low disagreement states and fully reveals high
disagreement states.
Moreover, consider the models of Section 6.1, in which citizens share the same payoff
function but hold different prior beliefs. In these cases, regardless of priors, full information
disclosure is always optimal for the minority candidate. Complete transparency eliminates
political disagreement and the policy advantage of the majority candidate, thus increasing the
chances of the minority candidate. Therefore, for policy issues in which political disagreement
derives solely from belief disagreement, we should empirically observe that policy experiments
32
by minority incumbents are more informative than those of majority incumbents.
Policy-Motivated Parties: In this paper, we focus on a purely office-motivated incum-
bent party, whose primary concern is to be re-elected. Consider, now, the opposite case: a
purely policy-motivated party. Suppose that each party has the same payoff function as the
voter it represents, and parties do not receive any direct benefit from holding office. That
is, when party i ∈ {A,B} is the incumbent, it chooses the experiment that maximizes the
expected payoff of voter i.
Intuitively, if the payoff functions of the two groups are sufficiently aligned, then a fully
informative experiment is optimal, independently of the incumbent’s valence. This is in spite
of the fact that a fully informative experiment might reduce the probability of re-electing the
incumbent. That is, the policy-motivated IP is willing to sacrifice its re-election probability
in order to generate more information to both candidates and guarantee a better policy.
However, the incumbent faces a more intricate problem when there is a large conflict
of preferences (for example, see the preferences in Proposition 2). In this case, the IP
prefers a more-informative experiment when the incumbent’s valence is large and she is
almost sure to win. In this case, it is valuable to provide information to the likely winner.
In contrast, when the incumbent is very incompetent and likely to lose, the IP prefers to
implement a less-informative experiment. Again, the policy-motivated IP is willing to forgo
the possibility of implementing a more-informative experiment — and, hence, increase its
re-election probability — simply to avoid detrimental policies from the opposing party.
Interestingly, it seems that the purely policy-motivated case resembles the case of a purely
office-motivated party, with a log-convex valence distribution. If, empirically, one finds that
more competent incumbents tend to implement weakly more-informative experiments, then
it is harder to say whether politicians are policy-motivated or office-motivated with a log-
convex distribution of valence. However, if, empirically, one finds that more competent
incumbents choose less-informative experiments, then it is more likely that parties are purely
office-motivated with a log-concave valence distribution.
It would be interesting to consider an alternative model in which parties are both policy-
and office-motivated. We leave this promising agenda to future work.
Competition-in-persuasion: In this paper, we have focused on the case in which the
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incumbent has the monopoly over the information that reaches voters. What happens if the
challenger can launch her own public investigation? We next describe some results on this
“competition-in-persuasion” game (see the online Appendix for details).
The timing of this extended game is as follows. The incumbent party implements an
experiment pi, and its outcome becomes public. The opposing party then chooses an exper-
iment, and its result becomes public.25 The valence of the challenging candidate is realized
and becomes public information. The election takes place. We consider two cases. In the first
case, the challenger is unconstrained — she has access to every experiment that is correlated
with the state. In the second case, the challenger is constrained on her access to experiments.
When the challenger is unconstrained, we show that there is always a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which the incumbent selects a fully informative experiment. The intuition
behind the result follows from the fact that parties have opposite preferences over the dis-
closure of information. Loosely speaking, if the incumbent benefits from “garbling” certain
information, then the challenger benefits from disclosing it. Therefore, the incumbent can
do no better than fully disclosing the state.
In practice, however, the incumbent typically has access to a richer set of experiments
than the challenger does since the incumbent directly controls the government. How do
constraints in the challenger’s access to experiments alter, in equilibrium, the information
that reaches voters? To provide some insights into this question, in online Appendix B
we consider an information technology in which the challenger’s ability to launch a fully
informative investigation is captured by an exogenous technology parameter α ∈ (0, 1). We
show that, in equilibrium, voters have access to more information if the challenger has easier
access to the government’s information (a higher α).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the strategic control of information by an incumbent who wants to be
re-elected. The incumbent, through her direct control of the government, is in a privileged
position to control the information that reaches voters. For example, she can run a small-scale
25We believe that the most natural assumption for our model is to have the incumbent playing first. See
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) for a model in which players choose experiments simultaneously.
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pilot test of a novel policy, design an experiment to evaluate unobserved effects of existing
policies, decide which information is released during the early stages of a complex policy
reform, and establish disclosure rules for government agencies. In all these cases, the public
information generated by the government can affect the incumbent’s re-election probability.
In our benchmark model, information changes the degree of political disagreement and
sways future elections — experimental outcomes that increase disagreement increase the
victory probability of the candidate whose preferences and beliefs are similar to those of
a majority of voters. Therefore, an incumbent supported by the majority benefits from
policy experiments that create more dissent between the majority and the minority. We
derive conditions such that more-competent politicians are less informative than incompetent
politicians, and conditions for an upper-censoring experiment to be optimal — it fully reveals
low disagreement states and pools high disagreement states. Finally, we consider cases in
which all voters share the same payoff function, so that political disagreement is due solely
to belief disagreement. We show that, even in these cases, policy experiments can be used
to increase disagreement.
In this paper, we focus on an incumbent who has the monopoly over the information
generated by the government. In this case, she often chooses to hide some information,
in order to maximize her re-election probability. We then extend our model to consider
competition in information provision between the incumbent and the challenger. We show
that if the challenger has full access to the same government information as the incumbent,
then there always exists an equilibrium in which competition forces the incumbent to be
fully transparent. However, we believe that, in most cases, the challenger has only limited
access to government information. In this case, we show that the incumbent retains the
incentives to hide some information. That is, if the challenger has less-than-perfect access
to information, then voters might not become fully informed. We hope that our model
can be further extended to study the roles of different political institutions in providing the
correct incentives to incumbent politicians. For instance, in a related model, Bernecker,
Boyer and Gathmann (2015) provide empirical evidence that term limits affect incumbents’
incentives to experiment. It would be important to also understand how the decentralization
of information generation, from the federal government to the states, affects the behavior of
governors from different parties, who are concerned with re-election.
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A Appendix
Before we present the proof of Lemma 1, we provide the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 Fix any a, b, c ∈ R. Define
G
(
a, b, vA
) ≡ F (b+ vA)− F (a+ vA)
f (a+ vA)
. (11)
If F satisfies (A1), then G(a, b, vA) is non-increasing in vA.
Proof of Lemma A.1: We first rewrite the function G as
G
(
a, b, vA
)
=
∫ b−a
0
f
(
a+ vA + z
)
f (a+ vA)
dz.
Since f is log-concave, it exhibits decreasing ratios in the sense that for every z > 0 and
vA ≥ vA′ we have
f
(
a+ vA′ + z
)
f (a+ vA′)
≥ f
(
a+ vA + z
)
f (a+ vA)
. (12)
Suppose first that b > a. Then integrating both sides of (12) between 0 and b− a shows
that G
(
a, b, vA′
) ≥ G (a, b, vA). Now suppose that a > b. Then for any z ∈ [0, a− b] we can
rewrite (12) as
f
(
a+ vA − z)
f (a+ vA)
≥ f
(
a+ vA′ − z)
f (a+ vA′)
.
Integrating between 0 and b− a we conclude that
−G (a, b, vA) = ∫ a−b
0
f
(
a+ vA − z)
f (a+ vA)
dz ≥
∫ a−b
0
f
(
a+ vA′ − z)
f (a+ vA′)
dz = −G (a, b, vA′) ,
or, in other words, G
(
a, b, vA′
) ≥ G (a, b, vA). 
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider an experiment pi that generates a distribution σ ∈ ∆(∆(Θ))
over posterior beliefs. Note that this distribution is independent of valences. For any q in
the support of σ, the change in the victory probability of the majority candidate is
W (q; vA)−W (p; vA) = F (D(qA) + vA)− F (D(p) + vA) = f(D(p) + vA)G(D(p), D(q), vA),
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where G is defined by (11). Therefore, the expected change in victory probability from
experiment pi can be written as
Epi[W (q; v
A)−W (p; vA)] = f(D(p) + vA)
∫
q∈ supp(σ)
G(D(p), D(q), vA)dσ.
Because f > 0 rewrite
Epi[W (q; v
A)−W (p; vA)]
f(D(p) + vA)
=
∫
q∈supp(σ)
G(D(p), D(q), vA)dσ. (13)
From Lemma A.1, we know that G is non-increasing in vA, hence the LHS of (13) is non-
increasing in vA. This implies that if Epi[W (q; v
A) − W (p; vA)] ≤ 0 then Epi[W (q; vA′) −
W (p; vA′)] ≤ 0 for any vA′ > vA, concluding the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose pi∗ is an optimal experiment given valence vA. Take
any vA′ > vA and any pi′ that is Blackwell more informative than pi∗. The proof has two
steps. In the first step, we construct a sequential experiment {pi∗, {pis}s∈S} that is payoff
equivalent to pi′. In the second step, we show that since pi∗ is weakly better than {pi∗, {pis}s∈S}
when valence is vA, then pi∗ is weakly better than {pi∗, {pis}s∈S} when the valence is higher.
Consequently, pi∗ is weakly better than pi′ for any vA′ > vA.
Step 1: If pi′, with realizations zpi′ ∈ Zpi′ , is Blackwell more informative than pi∗, with
realizations s ∈ S, then there exist an stochastic transformation γ(s|zpi′) such that
Pr [θ, s] =
∑
zpi′∈Zpi′
γ(s|zpi′) Pr [θ, zpi′ ] . (14)
Let τ (zpi′ ; s) be
τ (zpi′ ; s) =
γ(s|zpi′) Pr [zpi′ ]∑
zˆpi′
γ(s|zˆpi′) Pr [zˆpi′ ] = γ(s|zpi
′)
Pr [zpi′ ]
Pr [s]
(15)
and define the experiment pis as the experiment that, when voters have belief qs, it leads
to a posterior qzpi′ with probability τ (zpi′ ; s). In other words, experiment pis is described by
the conditional probabilities pis (zpi′|θ) = qθzpi′τ (zpi′ ; s) /qθs (see KG). We now show that this
experiment is well defined. First, it is immediate that τ (zpi′ ; s) ≥ 0 with
∑
zpi′∈Zpi′ τ (zpi′ ; s) =
1. Next, using (15) we have
qθs =
Pr [θ, s]
Pr [s]
=
∑
zpi′∈Zpi′ γ(s|zpi′) Pr [θ, zpi′ ]∑
zˆpi′∈Zpi′ γ(s|zˆpi′) Pr [zˆpi′ ]
=
∑
zpi′∈Zpi′
τ (zpi′ ; s)
Pr [θ, zpi′ ]
Pr [zpi′ ]
=
∑
zpi′∈Zpi′
τ (zpi′ ; s) q
θ
zpi′
,
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so that experiment pis is Bayes feasible.
Finally, we show that the observation by voters of the outcomes of the sequential ex-
periment {pi∗, {pis}s∈S} leads to the same joint distribution over posteriors and the state as
experiment pi′. Let ∪s∈S {s, zpi′} be the event in which voters have posterior qzpi′ . We have
Pr [θ,∪s∈S {s, zpi′}] =
∑
s∈S
pis (zpi′|θ) Pr [θ, s] =
∑
s∈S
qθzpi′τ (zpi′ ; s)
qθs
Pr [θ, s]
=
∑
s∈S
qθzpi′τ (zpi′ ; s) Pr [s] = q
θ
zpi′
∑
s∈S
γ(s|zpi′) Pr [zpi′ ]
= qθzpi′ Pr [zpi′ ] = Pr [θ, zpi′ ] .
Step 2: When the incumbent’s valence is vA, optimality of pi∗ implies that IP does not
benefit from further disclosing information after each signal realization s of pi∗. That is, for
every posterior belief qs in the support of pi
∗ and every experiment pis, we have
Epis [W (q; v
A)|qs] ≤ W (qs; vA). (16)
Apply Lemma 1-(i) to (16): for each posterior belief qs in the support of pi
∗, for every vA′ >
vA, and every experiment pis, we have Epis [W (q; v
A′)|qs] ≤ W (qs; vA′). Taking expectations
over the realizations of pi∗ yields E{pi∗,{pis}s∈S}[W (q; v
A′)] ≤ Epi∗ [W (q; vA′)]. 
Proof of Corollary 1: Suppose that for some vA2 a completely uninformative experiment
is optimal, and note that every possible experiment is Blackwell more informative than
no information. Then Proposition 1 immediately implies that a completely uninformative
experiment is weakly better than every other experiment for any vA > vA2 .
Suppose that for some vA1 the fully informative experiment pi
FD is optimal. Alonso and
Caˆmara (2016a, Corollary 2) show that a fully informative experiment is optimal if and
only if EpiFD [W (q
′; vA1 )|q] ≥ W (q; vA1 ) for all q ∈ ∆(Θ). Lemma 1 implies that26 for every
vA < vA1 , we have EpiFD [W (q
′; vA)|q] ≥ W (q; vA) for all q ∈ ∆(Θ). Hence, piFD is optimal for
all vA < vA1 . 
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose βAβB < 0 or |βB| > 2|βA|. This implies that βA 6= βB
and βB(2βA − βB) < 0.
26Lemma 1 implies that if Epi[W (q; v
A) − W (p; vA)] ≥ 0, then Epi[W (q; vA′) − W (p; vA′)] ≥ 0 for any
vA′ < vA.
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We first show that, from the point of view of voter A, the expected policy payoff if can-
didate B is elected is strictly lower if the candidate observes a fully informative experiment,
compared to no information. That is, full information makes candidate B choose a strictly
worse policy on average.
Without further information, candidate B chooses policy βBE[θ|p], which yields expected
policy payoff E[−(βBE[θ|p]−βAθ)2|p] to voter A. With a fully informative signal, candidate
B chooses policy βBθ after learning that the state is θ. This yields an expected policy payoff
E[−(βBθ − βAθ)2|p] to voter A. No information yields a strictly higher payoff than full
information if and only if
E[−(βBE[θ|p]− βAθ)2|p] > E[−(βBθ − βAθ)2|p]
−(βB)2E[θ|p]2 + 2βAβBE[θ|p]2 − (βA)2E[θ2|p] > −(βB)2E[θ2|p] + 2βAβBE[θ2|p]− (βA)2E[θ2|p]
(2βAβB − (βB)2)E[θ|p]2 > (2βAβB − (βB)2)E[θ2|p]
0 > βB(2βA − βB)(E[θ2|p]− E[θ|p]2).
Since the variance (E[θ2|p] − E[θ|p]2) is strictly positive given any interior prior belief, the
inequality holds if and only if 0 > βB(2βA − βB), concluding this step of the proof.
Disagreement is a convex function of the posterior belief, D(q) = (βB − βA)2(E[θ|q])2.
Consequently, if vA is sufficiently low, then the IP’s optimal experiment is fully informative.
From the point of view of voter A, compared to no information, full information leads
candidate B to choose a worse policy on average, while it leads candidate A to choose a
better policy when elected. Moreover, if vA is sufficiently low, then candidate B is sufficiently
likely to win the election, and the strictly negative effect of a worse policy from candidate B
dominates the positive effect from the better policy from candidate A. 
In Proposition A.1 below, we show that upper-censoring is an optimal experiment for a
large class of Bayesian persuasion games. Then, in the proof of Proposition 3, we show that
our model satisfies the conditions of Proposition A.1.
Proposition A.1 Consider a Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and a receiver,
as in KG. Suppose that the sender’s payoff uS(a, θ) and receiver’s optimal action a
∗(q) satisfy∑
θ∈Θ
qθuS(a
∗(q), θ) = K(E[θ|q]), (17)
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where K(·) is twice differentiable and strictly increasing, and E[θ|q] denotes the expected state
given posterior belief q. If K ′ is single-peaked (single-dipped), then there exists an optimal
signal that is upper-censoring (lower-censoring).
Proof of Proposition A.1:
Note that US(q) =
∑
θ∈Θ qθuS(a
∗(q), θ) is the sender’s expected payoff, as a function of
posterior belief q. Therefore, (17) implies that the sender’s expected utility depends on pos-
terior beliefs only through the posterior expectation of the state. Furthermore, function K is
assumed to be twice differentiable, with a strictly positive derivative K ′(E) ≡ dK(e)
de
∣∣∣
e=E
> 0.
First, suppose that K ′ is single-peaked — that is, there exists an E¯ in the extended real
line such that K ′′(E) ≥ 0 for all E < E¯, and K ′′(E) ≤ 0 for all E > E¯. Consequently, K
is locally convex in the range E < E¯, and locally concave in the range E > E¯. Since K ′
might be “flat” at its peak, we define E¯ as the lowest expectation at the peak. That is, E¯
is defined such that K ′(E) < K ′(E¯) for all E < E¯, and K ′(E¯) ≥ K ′(E) for all E ≥ E¯.
Since θ1 < . . . < θN , players’ posterior expectation of the state must be in [θ1, θN ]. If
E¯ ≥ θN , then the sender’s payoff is everywhere convex and a fully informative experiment
is optimal; if E¯ ≤ θ1, then the sender’s payoff is everywhere concave and a completely
uninformative experiment is optimal (see KG for details). Note that full disclosure and no
disclosure are the extreme cases of upper-censoring, with cutoff states θN and θ1, respectively.
Now consider the remaining case: θ1 < E¯ < θN . We next construct an optimal experi-
ment that is upper-censoring. The proof has two steps.
Step 1) We first show that, among the class of optimal experiments, there is always one that
induces at most one non-degenerate posterior belief. To see this, take any optimal experi-
ment pi∗ and let σ∗ be the the distribution of posterior beliefs induced by this experiment. All
beliefs q− in the support of σ∗ such that E[θ|q−] < E¯ are in the locally convex region of K.
Hence, the sender weakly benefits from further disclosing some information. All beliefs q+ in
the support of σ∗ such that E[θ|q−] ≥ E¯ are in the locally concave region of K. Hence, the
sender weakly benefits from combining all these beliefs into a single belief. Repeated use of
this argument implies the following. There exists an experiment pi′ that (i) is weakly better
than pi∗, hence pi′ is also optimal, and (ii) letting σ′ be the distribution of posterior beliefs
induced by pi′, there is at most one non degenerate belief in the support of σ′. This non degen-
40
erate belief is in the concave region of K, while every belief in the convex region is degenerate.
Step 2) We now solve for the optimal experiment in the class of experiments that induce
at most one non degenerate belief. Given Step 1, this experiment is then optimal for the
sender when she is unconstrained in her choice of experiment.
Consider any experiment that induces at most one non degenerate belief. Without loss
of generality, define the signal space as S ≡ {sθ1 , . . . , sθN , spooling}. Each state θ ∈ Θ induces
the pooling signal spooling with probability αθ ∈ [0, 1], and induces the fully revealing signal
sθ with probability 1 − αθ. Given α = (αθ1 , . . . , αθN ), let q+(α) ≡
(
αθpθ∑
θ′∈Θ αθ′pθ′
)
θ∈Θ
be the
updated posterior belief after observing spooling, and E
+(α) ≡ 〈q+(α), θ〉 =
∑
θ∈Θ αθpθθ∑
θ∈Θ αθpθ
be the
updated expectation of θ. The sender’s problem then simplifies to choosing α that maximizes
her expected payoff:
max
αθ∈[0,1],θ∈Θ
Π(α) ≡
(∑
θ∈Θ
αθpθ
)
K(E+(α)) +
∑
θ∈Θ
(1− αθ)pθK(θ).
We now solve for an optimal α∗ and show that the optimal experiment is upper-censoring,
that is, there exists a cutoff state θk such that α
∗
θ = 0 if θ < θk and α
∗
θ = 1 if θ > θk.
From Step 1, the pooling belief q+(α∗) is in the concave region, E+[α∗] ≥ E¯. Moreover,
since posterior beliefs in the convex region are degenerate, we have α∗θ = 1 for all θ ≥ E¯.
Now consider the convex region θ < E¯. Taking the derivative of the objective function with
respect to αθ′ for each state θ
′ < E¯, and noting that ∂E
+(α)
∂αθ′
=
pθ′∑
θ∈Θ αθpθ
[θ′ − E+(α)] , we have
∂Π(α)
∂αθ′
= pθ′K(E
+(α))− pθ′K(θ′) +
(∑
θ∈Θ
αθpθ
)
K ′(E+(α))
∂E+(α)
∂αθ′
= pθ′
{
K(E+(α))−K(θ′) +K ′(E+(α)) [θ′ − E+(α)]}
= pθ′
∫ E+(α)
θ′
[
K ′(E)−K ′(E+(α))] dE.
Since pθ′ > 0, the derivative
∂Π(α)
∂αθ′
has the same sign as
A(θ′) ≡
∫ E+(α)
θ′
[
K ′(E)−K ′(E+(α))] dE.
Suppose that α∗θ′ < 1 for some θ
′ < E¯, which implies that A(θ′) ≤ 0. Single-peakedness
of K ′ implies that K ′ is increasing for θ < E¯. Therefore, K ′(θ) ≤ K ′(θ′) for all θ < θ′, which
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leads to A(θ) < A(θ′) ≤ 0 for all θ < θ′. This establishes that, for all θ < θ′, we must have
α∗θ = 0.
The same steps of the proof show the opposite (lower-censoring) result for the case of a
single-dipped K ′. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that (A.1) and (A.2′) hold. Then we can write the IP’s
payoff as a strictly increasing, twice differentiable function of the expected state, K(E) =
F (H(E) + vA). Moreover, the derivative K ′(E) = f(H(E) + vA)H ′(E) is log-concave,
therefore it is single-peaked. Consequently, the conditions of Proposition A.1 hold and
there is an optimal experiment that is upper-censoring. The fact that the optimal censoring
cutoff weakly decreases in vA follows immediately from Proposition 1: strictly increasing the
censoring cutoff increases the informativeness of the experiment, but the IP does not benefit
from a more informative experiment if vA increases. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof has two steps.
Step 1) Define the vector v = r
(
θ − E[θ|qB]), the linear subspacesW1 = {x ∈ Rcard(Θ) : 〈x, 1〉 = 0}
and Wθ−v =
{
x ∈ Rcard(Θ) : 〈x, θ − v〉 = 0}. In this first step, we prove that if the projec-
tions of θ and r are not negatively collinear with respect to W1 ∩Wθ−v, then there exists an
experiment pi where all signal realizations increase political disagreement.
Since qBθ =
qAθ rθ
〈qA,r〉 (see Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a)), we can rewrite
D(qA, qB) = R(|E[θ|qA]− E[θ|qB]|) = R
(∣∣∣∣∣〈qA, θ〉−
〈
qAr, θ
〉
〈qA, r〉
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≡ D(qA).
Define qA = ελ+ pA, with λ ∈ W1 = {x : 〈x, 1〉 = 0} and ε ∈ R, and let
L(ε;λ) =
〈
qA, θ
〉− 〈qAr, θ〉〈qA, r〉 = ε 〈λ, θ〉+ E[θ|qA]− ε 〈λ, rθ〉+ E[θ|qB]ε 〈λ, r〉+ 1 .
Disagreement is a strictly increasing function of the absolute value of L(ε;λ). First suppose
that L(ε;λ) ≥ 0. We will show that under the conditions of the proposition one can always
find a vector of “marginal beliefs” λ′ such that L achieves a local minimum with respect to ε
at ε = 0. This means that along the line λ′ and in a neighborhood of 0, any belief qA = ελ′+pA
with ε > 0 increases L, and thus D(qA) > D(pA), while any belief qA = ελ′ + pA with ε < 0
also increases L, yielding D(qA) > D(pA). That is, we have found collinear beliefs that can
average to the prior and that increase D.
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First, we have
dL
dε
= 〈λ, θ〉 − 〈λ, rθ〉 − 〈λ, r〉E
[
θ|qB]
(ε 〈λ, r〉+ 1)2 ,
d2L
dε2
=
2 〈λ, r〉 [〈λ, rθ〉 − 〈λ, r〉E [θ|qB]]
(ε 〈λ, r〉+ 1)3 .
For L(ε;λ) to achieve a local minimum at ε = 0, it is sufficient to exist λ ∈ W such that
dL
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= 0⇒ 〈λ, θ〉 = 〈λ, r (θ − E [θ|qB])〉 , (18)
d2L
dε2
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
> 0⇒ 〈λ, r〉 〈λ, r (θ − E [θ|qB])〉 > 0. (19)
Since θ and r are not negatively collinear with respect to W1 ∩Wθ−v, then there exists
λ′ ∈ W1 ∩Wθ−v with 〈λ′, θ〉 〈λ′, r〉 > 0 — see Alonso and Caˆmara (2016a). Since λ′ ∈ Wθ−v
then λ′ satisfies (18). Then, given (18), the fact that 〈λ′, θ〉 〈λ′, r〉 > 0 implies that λ′ also
satisfies (19). Therefore, L(ε;λ′) achieves a local minimum at ε = 0.
Now consider the remaining case, L(ε;λ) < 0. Since disagreement strictly increases in
the absolute value of L, we now can increase disagreement by decreasing L. The same steps
of the proof above can be used to show that under the conditions of the proposition one can
always find a vector of “marginal beliefs” λ′′ such that L achieves a local maximum with
respect to ε at ε = 0. This follows as the fact that θ and r are not negatively collinear with
respect to W1 ∩Wθ−v implies the existence of λ′′ ∈ W1 ∩Wθ−v with 〈λ′′, θ〉 〈λ′′, r〉 < 0 (see
Alonso and Caˆmara 2016a), so that L(ε;λ′′) is locally concave at ε = 0. This concludes the
first step of the proof.
Step 2) The previous step shows that if the projection of θ and r are not negatively
collinear with respect to W1∩Wθ−v then persuasion is valuable. We now show that negative
collinearity of θ and r with respect to W1 ∩Wθ−v is a non-generic property if N ≥ 4. First
note that W1 ∩ Wθ−v has at least dimension N − 2, and thus the projections of θ and r
also have dimension N − 2 ≥ 2. As collinearity is a non-generic property with vectors of
dimension at least 2, this concludes the proof. 
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